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Summary findings
Land and real estate reforms have not been effective at  stage than they should, considering their great impact on
achieving their objectives, in part because of how they  poverty, growth, and stability. They base their
have been designed and implemented. To be successful,  conclusion on the limited coverage of land and real
reforms must become comprehensive in design, argue  estate issues in country assistance strategies, the main
Galal and Razzaz, although implementation may be  vehicle for identifying priority areas for reform.
phased over time and take local conditions into account.  Most Bank-supported projects do not address all three
Reform must include three elements:  elements critical for reform. And most provide no
* Institutional reforms that better define property  justification for excluding them, and no plan for follow-up.
rights, reduce information  asymmetry, and improve  The Bank's Operations Evaluation Department  rates
contract enforcement.  Bank-supported land and real estate projects relatively
* Capital market reforms that make mortgage finance  well on outcome and sustainability but not on
available at reasonable rates, especially for the poor.  institutional development. But land and real estate
* Market reforms that reduce or eliminate the main  reform is institutional  by nature.
distortions in the prices of goods and services  Galal and Razzaz urge the Bank and policymakers to
produced by land and real estate assets.  change course. After a comprehensive assessment of the
In their review of land and real estate reforms  status of real estate institutions and markets, all actors in
supported  by the World Bank, Galal and Razzaz find that  this sector should be pulled together to develop a
such reforms receive less attention at the conceptual  comprehensive approach to land and real estate reform.
This paper-a  product of the Private Provision of Public  Services  Group, Private Sector Advisory Services-is  part of a larger
effort in the department to examine the role of real assets in private sector development. Copies of the paper are available
free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please  contact Dominique Dietrich, room H8 -276,
telephone 202-473-4995,  fax 202-477-1993,  email address ddietrich@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers
are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.  Omar Razzaz may be contacted at orazzaz@worldbank.org. June
2001.  (39 pages)
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Land and real estatel assets account for 45-75% of the wealth of developing countries
(Ibotson, et al., 1985). These assets have the unique characteristics of being
simultaneously a major input into production activities (agriculture, industry, and
services), and into consumption by households of residential real estate and infrastructure
services.  For agriculture, land is the most important factor of production. For enterprises,
especially of small and medium size, land and real estate are the largest cost center
second only to labor. For poor households, land and real estate are the single most
significant vehicle for saving and the largest item of expenditure.
All too often, however, land and real estate assets are seriously underutilized as
inputs in production and as vehicles for saving or leveraging of resources.  This is true for
most developing economies, especially the poorest among them. In the case of Egypt,
informal real estate accounts for 92 percent of the dwellings in the urban sector and 87
percent of the holdings in the rural sector. The value of these dead assets is estimated at
US$240 billion, relative to a GDP of around $75 billion (De Soto, 1997). Whether
measured by fornality  of ownership, access to mortgage finance, access to infrastructure
services, or the flexibility of re-deploying assets across altemnative  uses, significant
disparities remain within and across countries.  For example, informal housing ranges
from 15 percent of the total housing stock in East Asia to more than 65 percent in Africa
(Urban 21: World Commission, 1999); the share of housing credit to total housing
investment ranges from less than 10 percent in most developing countries to more than 50
percent in East Asian countries, and to 85 percent in OECD countries (excluding the US
and Turkey) (Buckley, 1996).
Over the last decade, momentum has been building to bridge these disparities.  In
transition economies, post-privatization reforms are centered on increasing the ability of
households and firms to exercise their property rights over privatized assets.  In East
Asia, the recent crisis has highlighted the connection between international capital flows,
exchange rates, banking sector stability, and cycles in real estate markets (Renaud, et al.,
i Real  estate  is defined  in Black's  Law  Dictionary  as  "land  and  anything  permanently  affixed  to
the  land."  However,  lay  usage  of the  term  "real  estate"  often  refers  to urban  real  estate  and
excludes  agricultural  land;  hence  our  use  of land  and  real  estate  to emphasize  the rural-urban
scope  of this  study.
21998). In Latin America, the waves of liberalization, democratization, decentralization,
and post-conflict reconstruction have focused attention on market-assisted land reforms
in rural areas, and more transparent and equitable planning and service delivery
procedures in urban areas. These same forces are creating momentum for bridging gaps
in access to, and use of land and real estate in, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.
Notwithstanding this reorientation, there is evidence to support the notion that
reforms to better utilize land and real estate have not produced maximum benefits to their
owners and users. In this paper, we argue that this outcome can be traced, at least in part,
to the narrow focus of attempted reforms on only one aspect or another of land and real
estate's many key dimensions. In particular, the absence of a comprehensive approach or
a "road map" to guide the design of reforms often produces reforms that focus too
narrowly on, for example, technical intervention at the expense of legal reform (e.g.
physical cadastre instead of land registration). Or it produces emphasis on one set of
reforms while ignoring another set which is a necessary prerequisite (e.g. focusing on
mortgage finance with little attention to the status of property rights and land
registration).  Or the focus is given to one sector ignoring the interaction with another
(e.g. urban land focus ignoring rural land conversion). Even though some specific reform
actions can and do produce positive results, the impact and sustainability of such results
can be seriously undermined in the absence of an overall strategy which capitalizes on
such reforms.
In the remainder of the paper, we set out the case for a more systematic and
coherent approach to reforms.  First, we attempt to make the case for reforming land and
real estate markets by briefly reviewing the evidence on the linkages between reforms
and poverty reduction, economic growth, and stability. In Section 3, we develop a
conceptual framework, which traces the inherent characteristics of land and real estate
assets to different types of market and institutional failures. On the basis of this
framework, we recommend a set of policy and regulatory reforms.  In Section 4, we
evaluate the World Bank's  experience in supporting land and real estate reforms across a
wide range of countries over the last 10 years, with a view to exploring whether the
design of such support is consistent with the proposed framework. More specifically, we
3examine how strategies for reform are conceived, projects are designed, and outcomes are
evaluated.  We conclude, in Section 5, with a summary of our main findings.
2. Land, Real Estate and the Economy
The case for reforming land and real estate markets is compelling when viewed either
from the poverty reduction or a broader economic development perspective. There is
extensive and growing literature in support of the positive association between land
distribution, poverty reduction, and economic growth. There is also extensive literature,
which suggests that reforms to secure land tenure increase the productivity of land and its
value. Since most of the assets owned by the poor are held informally, this finding
suggests that land and real estate reforms are especially beneficial to this disadvantaged
group. Finally, there is evidence emerging from the East Asian crisis that traces the crisis,
at least in part, to imperfections in the real estate market. Given that such crises are
associated with widespread bankruptcies and deep recessions, they tend to affect the poor
disproportionately.  In the rest of this section, we provide partial review of this vast
literature, along with findings to the contrary.
Starting with asset poverty, it is worth noting that recent research has emphasized
asset distribution generally and landlessness specifically. Among these studies, Ravallion
and Sen (1994) and Besley and Burgess (1998) have shown that rural poverty and
landlessness go hand in hand.  Although substantial empirical evidence shows that small-
scale/family-based farming can be more efficient than large-scale farming, distortions
and barriers prevent a market-driven breakup of larger farms into smaller family-operated
units.  Chief among these barriers is asymmetric information in credit markets (see e.g.
Bowles, and Gintis, 1997; Deininger and Feder, 1998). Poor but efficient farmers are
unlikely to overcome the information asymmetry problem without adequate collateral,
putting them at a major disadvantage vis a vis asset rich farmers. A number of recent
papers have suggested the prevalence of a "poverty trap" that perpetuates the plight of
credit-constrained actors (Piketty, 1997; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Aghion and
Bolton, 1997). When actors are rationed out of the credit market, they are unable to
make bulky investments financed through their annual earnings, and therefore are unable
to escape the initially poor endowment of wealth (Galor and Zeira, 1993).
4These findings have implications not only for poverty reduction, but for
productivity and growth as well.  Indeed a number of empirical studies examined the
correlation between inequality in land ownership and growth: Alesina and Rodrik (1994)
found that a one-standard-deviation increase in equality in land ownership and income
(i.e. reduction in the gini coefficient) increases growth by more than one percentage
point.  These findings have been confirmed elsewhere in the literature (e.g.  Persson and
Tabellini, 1994). More recent studies have distinguished between asset inequality and
income inequality and found asset inequality to be more significant in affecting
subsequent growth (Deininger and Squire, 1996; Li, Squire, and Zou, 1997; and
Lundberge and Squire, 1999). Birdsall and Londono (1998) found the initial land gini,
along with the initial educational inequality, to have strong negative impacts on economic
growth and on the income growth of the poorest.
The strong evidence on the link between rural land distribution, rural poverty
reduction, and growth has not generated renewed interest in the massive land reform
policies of the 1950s. Notwithstanding the potential gains of carrying out effective land
reform (as seen in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China), these reforms are politically
difficult and costly (as reflected in the experience of land reforms in Latin America,
Africa, and the Middle East) (Banerjee, 1999). This has prompted policymakers to
consider alternative means to achieving redistribution of land, including "market-assisted
land reforms" in which the state assists the landless to acquire land by providing them
grants or subsidized loans and technical assistance to purchase land.
But landlessness is only one of several constraints facing the poor.  Indeed, when
poor households hold land, they still face constraints which frequently either prevent
them from fully benefiting from it or losing it altogether through distress sale.  A number
of studies have noted that in the absence of inter-temporal markets, especially in credit
and insurance, poor farmers are left without a risk coping mechanism, making them
highly vulnerable to distress sales, and putting them back into the ranks of the landless
(Deininger and Feder, 1998).
Another type of constraint facing the poor is that while they might "hold" land,
i.e. possess it, they might not have secure rights to it. The effects of insecure tenure have
been studied extensively in urban and rural literature in terms of its effect on value
5(mainly in urban areas) and productivity and access to credit (mainly in rural areas). In
urban areas, the focus has been on "informal" tenure.  While informal land tenure is not
always insecure, it often does entail a discount in value due a higher risk premium and
asymmetric information. Several studies point out the cost that the lack of legal title may
impose on households. In Jakarta, for example, residential plots with clear title sell at a
45 percent premium over comparable plots without clear title (Dowall, 1998). In Manila,
the risk of eviction lowers the value of the housing units by 25 percent (Dowall and Leaf,
1990; Dowall, 1998).  In Davao, the Philippines, Jimenez  (1984, 1988) finds a 58%
increase in value due to titling.  In the barrios of Quito, Equador, Simon (1995) finds a
21% increase in value due to land titling. In rural Thailand, Chalamwong and Feder
(1986) find that the prices of legally documented lands are significantly higher than those
of equal quality untitled land.  These differences, however, appear to originate primarily
from the credit advantage available to formal owners of land, who were found to secure
loans at 14-16 percent compared with 46-52 percent charged to informal land holders.
To be sure, not all poor households own or hold some form of land and real
estate: many are tenants.  But rental housing for the poor is often provided not by rich
slumlords as the stereotype might suggest, but rather by landlords who themselves are
poor and using rental income to reduce their vulnerability during economic downturns, or
to provide for subsistence during retirement.  This is evidenced best in a number of
studies where, in Mexico City for example, "the landlords of the urban periphery are
laborers, employees, traders, bricklayers or artisans" and only one-third of the landlords
had constructed the dwelling with the purpose of renting it (Coulomb, 1985:52, cited in
Gilbert and Varley, 1991: 133). A later study on Mexico found that many of the
landlords were indeed poor elderly couples or widows.  It concluded that "[t]he majority
of landlords are clearly operating on a small scale; they own only one rental property and
may not be conspicuously wealthier than their tenants" (Gilbert and Varley, 1991:153).
A comprehensive approach to helping poor city dwellers with security of tenure and
access to credit stands to help all - poor landlords and tenants - through the increased
supply of rental housing.
The literature assessing the impact of land tenure arrangements on productivity
indicates that insecure land tenure arrangements translate into lower output per unit of
6land, while more robust rights contribute to productivity. Again, this is manifested in
urban areas where investment in housing is correlated to the sense of security of tenure
(Jimenez, 1984) as well as in rural areas which focused on increased agricultural output
(see Collier ,1983; Feder, Onchan, and Hongladarom,1985; Atwood, David. 1990;
Rozelle, Guo and Brandt, 1996; Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak, 1998; Lin, 1992; Alston,
Libecap and Schnieder, 1995; Lopez, 1995; Carter and Olinto, 1996). In China, there is
evidence from a study by Yao (1996) that the increase in transferability of land has
allowed for a better allocation of household labor to non-agricultural sectors.
Beyond the link between land and real estate markets, poverty and economic
growth, the East Asian crisis has highlighted the potential adverse impact of real estate
bubbles on economic stability (Bertaud, 1998). In a recent paper on causes of financial
intermediary failure, Caprio and Honohan argue that "[i]n industrial countries, the most
characteristic cause of bank failure has been over-exposure of banks to a real estate
property boom, itself fuelled by an over-expansion of bank lending (pp.3, 1999)."  More
broadly, a review of banking crises in a number of countries over the last twenty years by
Byamugisha (1998) suggests that lending for and mortgaging real estate is a major reason
for the insolvency of banks.  Byamugisha shows that real estate played an important role
in the eruption of bank crises in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, and Chile at different
points in time.  Evidence of such a link between banking crises and real estate booms
th  ~~2 date back to the late 19th  century.  Typically, bank supervision is weak and bankers tend
to lend to lucrative activities, like real estate, even if the risk of default is relatively high.
This practice increases the probability of accumulating bad loans, which eventually leads
to insolvency of banks and very expensive bailouts. If bank failure is also associated with
exchange rate collapse, bankruptcies and recessions are inevitable, which deprive the
poor of their jobs and leads to a decline in real wages.
While the literature discussed above lends strong support to the notion that
reforming land and real estate can produce benefits to the poor, such a conclusion bears
important qualifications. A number of studies covering both urban and rural areas have
2  Calomiris, Charles, 1997 "The Postmodern Bank Safety Net" Washington D.C. The American Enterprise Institute.
Cited in Caprio and Honohan.
7questioned the effectiveness of specific instruments, such as land registration, housing
finance, or formalization of tenure in squatter settlements, as a panacea to poverty and
productivity issues. Plateau (1995) questions the conceptual underpinnings for doing land
registration in Sub Saharan Africa. He argues that property rights and demand for such
institutional arrangements have not evolved enough to warrant the supply of land
registration systems.  Varley (1987) questions the relationship between tenure
legalization and housing improvements and argues that such improvements are more the
result of provision of services, which often accompany legalization of tenure. Razzaz
(1991, 1993) finds no significance of titled over untitled peri-urban land in Amman,
Jordan, where the threat of eviction is minimal and formal credit is unavailable. In rural
areas, Bruce and Migot-Adholla (1994) do not find any consistent link between
robustness of property rights (proxied by the extent of transfer rights) and agricultural
yields in eight African countries. They speculate that the relative abundance of land and
the lack of development in factor markets (labor, capital) and farm produce may account
for such findings.  Similarly, Atwood (1990) and Carter and Weibe (1990) find no
increase in investment where credit markets are not available. In a study of the
relationship between owners and tenants with usufruct rights in Niger, Gavian and
Fafchamps (1996) find no significant difference in investment levels.  In this case, the
authors suggest that the usufruct holders held sufficient medium-term tenure security
over the land and therefore exhibited similar investment behavior to that of the land
owners.  It is also important to note that in studies from Honduras and Paraguay (Lopez,
1995; Carter and Olinto, 1996), while titled land gave some land-holders greater access to
existing credit markets and investment opportunities, the poorest (smallest land holders)
were still rationed out of participation.
Another common concern about formalization of property rights of the poor is the
effect on informal tenants: that formalization might drive property values up and displace
poor tenants.  This has indeed been observed in urban contexts when the scale of
forrnalization was very limited.  In contrast, when formalization is carried out on a broad
scale, more poor landlords have the incentives to consolidate and expand, ensuring a
more elastic supply of rental housing.
8The studies that find a weak link between one element of reform (say land
registration to secure tenure) and productivity or investment point to an important
conclusion. Namely, partial reforms may not always lead to the desired outcome. In some
cases, there is the possibility that the individual reform was intended to relax a constraint
that was not binding in the first place (e.g. providing individual titles in areas with strong
communal property rights). But it is also possible and even likely that reforns  to secure
property rights may not lead to the full benefits because mortgage finance is missing, or
the prices of goods and services derived from land and real estate are distorted. In other
words, instruments such as land redistribution, land registration, credit subsidies, physical
upgrading, etc. are each likely to be necessary but not sufficient to induce poverty
reduction or growth.  They are more likely to deliver positive outcomes if they are well-
coordinated as part of a reform package. This conclusion suggests the need for an
integrated framework to approach land and real estate reforms. The question is: How do
we move from a world of scattered instruments and policies to one where a reform
agenda drives the use of specific instruments of physical redistribution, upgrading,
registration, mortgage finance, taxation, and subsidies? The next section attempts to
sketch out such a framework.
3.  Analytical framework
Finding out how to better utilize land and real estate assets requires answering such
questions as: Why are many landholders reluctant or unable to make long-term
investments in land? Why do they opt, or find themselves obliged, to accept less than the
full value of and potential returns on their land and real estate? Why are the more
productive individuals in society unable or unwilling to acquire land and real estate assets
from the less productive? And why is land scarcely used as collateral, although it
potentially qualifies perhaps as the safest guarantee for credit because of its immobility
and lack of depreciation?
The above set of questions is clearly very broad.  Moreover, they have been
analyzed extensively as shown in section two of this paper. But the analysis has tended
to focus on specific constraints (credit, tenure, etc.) or specific sub-markets (housing,
commercial, agricultural, etc.). Less has been written, however, on the necessary
9structure of policy and institutional reforms to improve the functioning of land and real
estate markets and the utilization of these assets. In this section we attempt to develop an
analytical framework for the design of such a package, elaborate the normative
implications of this framework, and discuss limitations of implementation. The
cornerstone of the analysis is that land and real estate have their own unique
characteristics, which are associated with problems in the efficient use, exchange, and
development of land and real estate. Resolving these problems, therefore, constitutes the
basis for the desired reforms.
3.1 Land characteristics, associated problems and impact
From the perspective of reforming land and real estate markets, the following
characteristics stand out: (1) land and real estate are fixed in location; (2) they are
heterogeneous; (3) they require bulky finance to acquire and develop, and (4) their
demand is derived from the demand for the products and flow of services they help
generate. These characteristics, along with the associated problems and impact, are
shown in Table I and elaborated below.
10Tablel.  Land characteristics, associated problems, and impacts
Characteristics  of Real  Associated Problems  Impacts
Assets
1. Fixed in location  >  Negative/positive  >  Over/under investment, and
externalities, resulting from  government exposure to
actions by neighbors and  contingent liability
government
>  Government residual control  >  Risk of asset or income
(powers) over ownership and  expropriation, especially for
use of land could lead to  informally held assets,
opportunistic behavior  reduces incentives to trade
and invest
2. Heterogeneous  >  Information asymmetry, ill
defined property rights, and
high transaction costs  >  Inefficient exchange and loss
of productive and allocative
efficiency, especially where
transaction costs are fixed
and high
3.  Bulky  investment  >  Inability to finance the  0  Under investment where
acquisition and development  liquidity is constrained or
of land and real estate  risk premium is high.
through own savings, making
lack of term finance a
problem
>  Where term finance is  >  Financial crises driven by
available but capital markets  real estate cycles
underdeveloped, exposure to  >  Lack of access to collateral
real estate cycles through  by the poor, who may be
credit risk, interest rate risk,  more efficient users
and collateral risk.
4.  Derived  demand  >  Policy and tax distortions in  >  Misallocation of resources
input markets of agriculture
(e.g., fertilizer), housing
(e.g., cement) and finance
(e.g., interest rate)
>  Policy and tax distortions in  >  Policies aimed at making the
output markets of agriculture  poor better-off may actually
(e.g., cotton) and housing  have the opposite effect (rent
(e.g., rent control)  control)
Fixed  in location.  Land  is fixed in location,  as are the permanent  improvements  on it.
Fixed location exposes owners to positive and negative externalities resulting from
uncompensated actions by others, be it neighbors or government.  Owners can, for
example, realize windfalls from a reclassification of land from a low-value use to a
11higher-value use, or they can suffer substantial uncompensated losses from changing land
use regulations which could erode the value, use, or yield of their asset. Lack of credible
commitment by governments not to take arbitrary actions, absence of due process and full
compensation, widespread rent-seeking behavior by public agents, and spatial
uncompensated externalities all reduce the incentives for landholders to invest (e.g.
planting trees or upgrading houses) as much as they would have under a more predictable
regime. Buyers and lenders are likely to value assets less than they would have otherwise
to discount for these risks
The importance of credible government commitment follows from the
combination of the locational characteristic of land and real estate and the residual
control power enjoyed by all governments, at the federal and local levels. Governments
can, indeed, influence what owners can or cannot do with their assets through zoning
policies and land use controls, licenses and permits, price controls, and most drastically,
uncompensated expropriation (nationalization, land ceiling acts, etc.). 3 Even where
property rights are established and assigned, these rights have little value in the absence
of enforceability and adjudication.  In the case of informal settlements, lack of secure
tenure often derives from loose enforcement of property rights to begin with, and then an
inability of the legal system to recognize the de facto possessory rights of settlers.
Heterogeneity.  The heterogeneity of land real estate assets derives partly from their fixed
location -- each parcel of land and each building on it are unique, i.e. one real estate asset
is not a perfect substitute for another.  But heterogeneity also derives from endogenous
quality attributes such as soil quality, slope, etc. for agricultural land; and building
quality, features, useable space, etc. for urban real estate.  Finally, rights, privileges, and
powers over land and real estate can vary significantly from one asset to  another (rights
of owners and tenants, liens, residual controls by condominium association or local
government, etc.).
The credibility  and transparency  of government  participation  in markets  appears  to be a major factor  in
the decision  to invest  (Brunetti,  1997). Further  evidence  exists  that  the threat of expropriation  is one of
the major components  of risk in international  real estate  investment  decisions  (Jaffe,  year??). Both
studies  suggest  that credible  government  action  with  respect  to property  rights  may  have the affect  of
reducing  risk to investors  and lenders  and  thereby  spur investment  and lower  interest  rates.
12These heterogeneous features create asymmetry of information, whereby the
owners tend to know more about these assets than the buyers or lenders.  Because buyers
and lenders find it costly to collect this information, they tend to attach higher risks to
owning land and real estate or using it as collateral than would be the case if the
information was collected and made available to the public. To deal with the information
problem, governments create institutional mechanisms for registration and exchange of
property. But these arrangements, while improving the quality of information, often
involve extensive bureaucratic and technical procedures with high transaction costs. The
end result of all of this is limited exchange and less than full utilization and development
of assets.
Bulky Investment.  Financing the acquisition and development of land and real estate
requires resources often in excess of most individual household savings and certainly
their annual income. Where term finance is lacking, investment in these activities is
blocked. At the same time, where term finance is not well-placed, real state cycles could
contribute to financial crises as seen in East Asia.
The importance of finance in land and real estate markets is evident from such
observations as "cities are built the way they are financed" (Renaud, 1987). In developed
countries, housing finance is available for new as well as existing units, and at low
spreads which reflect the low risk premium thanks to collateral. In countries with
underdeveloped mortgage finance infrastructure, financial markets tend to serve only
upper income groups, new construction, and owner-occupied housing.  In countries with
non-existent mortgage finance, housing and real estate development in general are only
built incrementally, hence the often seen "unfinished" but occupied structures of middle
and lower income residents.
Further, a developing country often excludes a significant portion of its potential
market participants because of poor access to credit.  This defect reduces the number of
participants in the market, the number of transactions that take place, and thereby amount
and quality of information in the market.  Welfare is also reduced when due to lack of
credit, poor participants are unable to bid away land from wealthier participants who
might be less efficient landholders. Finally, the use of real property as collateral has the
13direct effect of reducing the likelihood of default on a loan and therefore has the potential
of reducing interest rates, reflecting lower risk, and thereby increasing the affordability of
credit to lower income groups. An increase in the number of collaterialized assets may
increase the flow of capital to financial markets and help to spur development in other
sectors (see, for example, evidence on business start ups, lack, 1996).
For most poor households, however, and for a multiplicity of reasons, formal
long-term mortgage finance will remain unattainable in developing countries.
Innovations in micro-finance and formal and informal savings associations, however, can
greatly contribute to meeting the demand for small incremental investments in land and
real estate.
Derived demand.  Because the demand for land and real estate assets is derived from the
demand for the products and services they produce, distortions in product and service
markets have bearing on the value and flow of benefits from the assets.  (See figure 1).
Government interventions in the form of price controls or subsidies of outputs and inputs
in these markets, as well as rent control, taxation, and tariff policies, increase or diminish
the value of land and real estate assets.  Where these distortions are pervasive, serious
misallocation of resources is inevitable. This conclusion applies to land and real estate
assets, in urban as well as rural areas, although the nature of derived demand varies, and
therefore, market conditions and sources of distortion vary as well.
Figure 1.
Distinct Land uses
Real Estate  Assets  *  Derived  Demand:
M  99  >  *  Housing
+  Services
+  Indust.  &
Com.Outputs
t  Agricultural 0 Outputs
A Nature
14In the market for agricultural products, price controls on crops, high tariffs on imported
inputs (e.g., fertilizer, seeds), or taxes on domestic products of these inputs have the
effect of reducing the value of and return from land. Labor and capital will be diverted
from agriculture to other activities, and agricultural output will be less than optimal.
Policy intervention in the opposite direction would encourage excessive use of and
investment in land, resulting in waste of scarce resources.  Policy interventions in the
industrial sector have similar effects.
In the housing market, perhaps the most widespread distortion is rent control.
Rent control is often justified on grounds of helping the urban poor.  More often than not,
however, rent control has the effect of reducing the supply of rental housing, lowering
maintenance, and creating market rigidities in which tenants with higher incomes remain
in rent control housing to capture the subsidy, even thought they are able to pay for
market rate housing.  Government tax and subsidy policies also affect tenure choice,
often creating a bias for single family housing and against rental housing.
In financial markets, government policies on interest rate subsidies, housing
finance monopolies, and underdeveloped mechanisms for saving mobilization all limit
the development of private mortgage lending, and hence access to credit for real estate
development and mortgage financing.
All these market distortions cause misallocation of resources.  In the case of land
and real estate markets, misallocation is particularly costly because it is not easy to
reverse by removing the policy distortions given the durability of real estate assets (see
A. Bertaud and B. Renaud "Cities without Land Markets". 1995).
3.2 Policy Implications
To reform land and real estate markets effectively, an attempt should be made to
simultaneously address all the problems emerging from the characteristics of these assets.
A summary of the proposed reforms is given in Table 2 and elaborated below.
15Table 2. Land characteristics, associated problems, and recommended reforms
Characteristics  Associated Problems  Nature of reforms
1. Fixed in location  Rights,  Information,
Contracting,  and  Enforcement
(RICE)
>  Negative  and  positive  >  Introduce  and  enforce  rules
externalities,  resulting  from  to protect  property  rights  and
actions  by  neighbors  and  assess  the  social  costs  and
government  benefits  of land  use
regulations.
>  Government  residual  control  >  Adopt  mechanisms  to
(powers)  over  ownership  and  enhance  the  credibility  of
use  of land  could  lead  to  government  commitment
opportunistic  behavior  (e.g.,  legalize  and  enforce
2. Heterogeneous  full  compensation  and  fair
resolution  of disputes)
>  Information  asymmetry,  ill  >  Establish  and  register  rights
defined  property  rights,  and  to land  and  real  estate,  and
high  transaction  costs  reduce  cost  of  compliance
>  Publicize  information  in
registries  and  market  trends
>  Strengthen  implementation
agencies
3. Bulky investment  Finance  & Risk
Management
>  Inability  to finance  the  >  Provide  a regulatory  regime
acquisition  and  development  to allow  the  development  of
of land  and  real  estate  mortgagee  finance
through  own  savings,  making  >  Assist  the  poor  in using  land
lack  of term  finance  a  and  real  estate  as collateral
problem  >  Enable  institutional  investors
(e.g.,  pension  funds)  to invest
>  Where  term  finance  is  in asset  backed  securities
available,  exposure  to real  >  Strengthen  the  ability  of
estate  cycles  through  credit  financial  institutions  to better
risk,  interest  rate  risk,  and  assess  and  manage  risk  of
collateral  risk.  lending  for  land  and  real
estate
4. Derived demand  Market  Structure  and Fiscal
Policy
>  Distortions  in input  markets  >  Remove/phase  out  price
of agriculture  (e.g.,  controls,  subsidies,
fertilizer),  housing  (e.g.,  differentiated  taxation,
cement)  and  finance  (e.g.,  excessive  tariffs  on
interest  rate)  agricultural  products
>  Remove/phase  out  rent
>  Distortions  in output  markets  control  and  interest  rate
of agriculture  (e.g.,  cotton),  subsidies
housing  (e.g.,  rent  control)  >  Use  targeted  subsidies  to
help  the  poor
16Rights, Information,  Contracting, and Enforcement
One of the most basic, albeit critical, areas of reform a government can undertake
is to develop effective property rights regimes. This includes: the constitutional
protection of property; the laws and regulations defining rights and obligations to
property; the means of assignment of rights to property; and the institutional
arrangements which register and enforce such rights.  Such a regime has the public good
elements of non-excludability and non-rivalry.
The problem of externalities can in principle be minimized by modalities that
internalize the costs and benefits to the producers of externalities (e.g. impact fees),
and/or by regulations on growth, density, and separation of uses (Fischel, 1989).
Similarly, the problem of government commitment can be resolved at least partially by
instituting measures that make it difficult and costly for government to reneg (e.g.,
constitutional guarantee of property rights, laws ensuring full compensation, mechanisms
for resolving conflicts fairly). For both actions to work, it is important that property rights
are well-established and enforced.
In carrying out the above reforms, two considerations have to be kept in mind.
First, regulatory measures for dealing with negative externalities may be too rigid, risking
imposing more costs than generating benefits.  Separation of uses, green belt regulations,
and density regulations are all prone to overkill (Fischel, 1989; Dowall, 1998). Second,
the fear of government opportunistic behavior has to be balanced with the recognition
that government residual control over land and real estate assets is not, in and of it self,
undesirable from an efficiency point of view.  After all, governments need to acquire
right-of-way for network infrastructure and acquire land for public uses and
environmental protection.  Governments are also the residual claimants of tax delinquent
property, abandoned property, and toxic sites.  What is undesirable is government
behavior that is not rule-bound and not subject to a due process which allows for recourse
and compensation in the case of loss.  In other words, while government, by definition,
has residual control, how it goes about exercising such control has to be perceived as well
defined as being fair by citizens.
17Finance  and Risk Management
Overcoming the bulkiness of investment and managing risk associated with land
and real estate requires financial and capital markets. While operational development
efforts tend to focus on establishing primary and secondary mortgage lending
intermediaries, less attention is given to the broader macro and regulatory reforms needed
to ensure their sustainability.  Priorities and sequencing will vary depending on the initial
conditions of the macro economy, institutional development, the banking sector, and
capital markets development. 4 Most reforms in this area would involve the undoing bad
regulations such as interest rate ceilings and state monopolies on housing finance.  But
reforms will also have to tackle the issue of how to extend market financing to lower
income groups. Innovations in mobilizing savings, lowering transaction costs, micro
lending, credit enhancement methods, and design of subsidy schemes need to be
examined in the context of reform.
Market Structure and Fiscal Policy
Finally, supply and demand for land and real estate can be highly distorted by
policies which artificially depress or inflate supply or demand.  Different land uses
(agriculture, housing, commercial) are subject to different regulatory and tax structures,
creating incentives and disincentives to convert from one use to another which have little
to do with allocative efficiency.  Regulation should carefully attempt to reduce market
distortions, not only for land and real estate themselves, but for the markets of the goods
and services they produce.  These reforms include price liberalization of inputs and
outputs in the agricultural sector, and the phasing out of rent control, interest subsidies,
and differentiated taxation.
3.3 Limitations and Constraints
No country can take on all the above reforms simultaneously. First, initial conditions vary
from country to country: the degree of informality, wealth distribution, the state of capital
4 According to Renaud (1997), six major groups of housing finance systems can be identified: Undeveloped systems
(Sub-Saharan Africa), missing systems (Former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, China, Vietnam),
fragmented and unstable systems (Latin America), segregated but stable systems (East Asia, Middle East, India),
18market development, the extent of market distortions, and property rights and contract
enforcement define the reform agenda. Second, the scope of reforms is far-reaching,
covering a wide range of sectors of the economy such that it might not be
administratively possible to carry out all reforms simultaneously, even if they were
desirable.  Third, reforms are likely to touch vested interests of bureaucrats who benefit
from the ambiguity of rules; banks, developers, and speculators enjoying market power
and/or insider information; and recipients of untargeted subsidies who stand to lose their
entitlements.
These constraints are not easy to overcome in practice, but they can be
minimized. With respect to the initial conditions, it is imperative that the reform process
starts with a comprehensive diagnosis, even if implementation is to be phased in over
time. Comprehensive diagnosis involves defining the problem and the deficiencies in the
three dimensions of the analytical framework outlined in the previous section. This
diagnosis will help to sort out the priority areas for reform. For example, if the analysis
reveals that the country's  financial sector is highly developed and there is no problem in
the access or cost of mortgage finance, the critical problems may then lie in the areas of
property rights and market distortions. Accordingly, efforts should be focused on the
latter. The next question is one of sequencing, given the country's administrative
capacity. Here, there is no optimal path to prescribe. But reformers could decide the
desired course of action, depending on the pockets of strength in government, the key
bottlenecks facing the exchange and use of land and real estate, and the location of
reform champions locally.
Perhaps the most difficult constraint is likely to be the political opposition to
reforms. One way of dealing with this constraint can be found in the framework
developed elsewhere to deal with privatization and state-owned enterprise reform
(Bureaucrats in Business, 1995). According to this framework, reforms are likely to take
place when three conditions are met: political desirability, political feasibility, and
political credibility. Political desirability occurs when the leadership finds it attractive to
adopt the reform, either because of a crisis or a shift in power. Political feasibility attains
sound and integrated systems (South East Asia, Malaysia, Thailand, etc) and advanced systems (Europe and North
America).
19when the executive branch is able to force the reform, gain support in parliament and/or
buy the support of reform opponents. Political credibility is necessary because reforrn
involves making promises to compensate the losers and winners, which only occur in the
future. In land and real estate reform, increasing the desirability of reform could involve
efforts to highlight the costs and benefits of the current regime to potential supporters.
Compensating the losers may be one effective mechanism for improving the feasibility of
reform. Credibility may be possible if the political leaders at the highest level are
engaged in the reform process.
Throughout, it is important to remember that successful implementation requires
more than just issuing new laws or regulations. It requires changes in incentives,
institutions, and behaviors. To give but two examples, while it is important that property
rights are well-defined and established, it is equally important that they be exercised.
Establishing, registering, and updating property rights to land and real estate would
clearly reduce the asymmetry and reduce transaction costs, but as a public good, such
provision of information suffers the typical problems of concentrated costs and dispersed
benefits. 5 Accordingly, the role of government engagement is indispensable. The second
example concerns the collection of accurate information about all land and real estate
assets and updating it. This is a daunting task, which many countries start but rarely
accomplish. In this regard, there is rich empirical experience on how to reduce the cost of
collecting and updating such information, how to utilize the private sector, and how to
turn land registries from "silos" of closely held information, to service providers to
prospective developers, buyers, and investors.  Developing and disseminating this
knowledge is crucial for better provision of this vital public good.
4.  Assessment of the World Bank Experience
Almost all developing countries have attempted in one form or another to reform their
land and real estate markets, some of them with the support of the World Bank. In this
section we examine the World Bank's role in these reform episodes by reviewing
evidence on strategy formulation, project design, and evaluation of outcome.  We begin
Unlike typical public goods, however, excludability is feasible, making cost recovery, and even generating net
government revenues a reality in many developed and developing countries.
20with a brief account of the portfolio of land and real estate projects supported by the
World Bank.  Next, we address three questions:
*  Do land and real estate issues receive adequate treatment at the strategy formulation
level? This question is addressed by analyzing the Bank's Country Assistance
Strategy (CAS) documents, which represent the key vehicle for conceptualizing the
Bank's reform agenda for client countries.
*  How well-designed are Bank-supported reforns  relative to the recommended design
presented in Section 3? We address this question by exploring whether Bank lending
operations simultaneously address the three dimensions of land and real estate reform.
*  Finally, what is the impact of Bank-supported projects?  In answering this question,
we rely on the project evaluations reports prepared by the Operations Evaluation
Department (OED) of the World Bank. These reports assess impact in terms of
outcomes, sustainability, and institutional development.
4.1 Portfolio of Bank  Supported Operations
An intensive search of the World Bank Lending Operations database for land and real
estate operations turned up 168 operations between 1989-1999. Only a subset of these
operations, however, focus exclusively on land and real estate; the rest are components in
sectoral or structural adjustment projects with a broad coverage of issues.  For the
purpose of this review, all operations are classified in three groups:  those with a primary,
secondary, and tertiary focus on land and real estate. The classification is revealing of
regional, sectoral, and temporal trends.
Projects with primary focus on land and real estate: These projects have the terms land,
cadastre, titling, real estate, or housing in their title, or identify one of these terms in their
objectives and components.  Examples are Lithuania-First Housing Project, Moldova-
First Cadastre Project, Colombia-Land Reform Project, Honduras-Agricultural Sector
Credit (in which securing land property rights is an immediate objective and a significant
component).  We identified 59 projects in this category.  Figure 2 shows an increase in
the number of projects focused on land and real estate since 1989. Figure 3 shows the
regional distribution of projects showing clearly that the main activities are in Eastern
Europe and Central Asia (ECA), and in Latin America (LAC).  Attention to land and real
21estate reforms in ECA is necessitated by the transformation process to a market economy
in these countries. In LAC, a number of factors contribute to the significance of land and
real estate issues.  Chief among them are post-conflict reconciliation, decentralization.
and democratization, all of which have given greater voice to landless and dispossessed
groups in society. Attention to land is being recognized as a prerequisite to bringing in
many improvements from infrastructure to access to credit. Most projects are in urban or
rural sectors, but almost one third are in finance, environment, industry, and public
sector. The diversity of sectors covered testifies to the importance of land and real estate
markets to multiple sectors, and explains the tendency of reforms to be partial, targeting
one aspect or another of land and real estate.
Figure 2: Primary Focus Projects
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2%)Projects with secondary focus on land and real estate: These projects cover real estate
issues, but their main objectives and components are much broader. They include a
number of municipal development, urban slum upgrading, rural development, and
infrastructure investment projects with reform or investment components in property tax,
land cadastre and titling, rural land funds, farm privatization, etc.  Examples include
Brazil-Municipal Development, Costa-Rica- Agricultural Sector Investment, India Assam
Rural Infrastructure, and Azerbaijan-Farm Privatization.  We identified 33 such projects
distributed by year as shown below.  Land and real estate representation in these types of
projects is clearly declining, reflecting a broad move in Bank projects toward a narrower
scope of project design.
Figure 5: Projects with Secondary Focus on Land and Real Estate
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Projects with tertiary focus on land and real estate: These are typically structural
adjustment loans, sector adjustment loans, or investment loans in which land and real
estate reforms or investments appear in the matrix of conditionality for loan
disbursement.  Examples are Vietnam Agricultural Diversification Project, Indonesia-
Surabaya Urban, Tunisia-Municipal Sector-Investment. We identified 76 such loans,
which are shown below by year.Figure 6
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4.2 Land and Real Estate in Country Assistance Strategies
To explore the extent to which land and real estate issues are covered adequately at the
strategy formulation level, we carried out a comprehensive search of the 158 Country
Assistance Strategies (CASs) completed since 1994  . Of the total, we found 43 CASs,
which mentioned land and real estate related key words.  These 43 CASs were then
reviewed in detail.  This review revealed that only 28 contain strategies/actions or
instruments for addressing land and real estate issues.
Factually, the review of the 28 CASs reveals that CASs approved by the Board after
1996 have better representation of the growing importance of the land and real estate
agenda.  CASs with the strongest emphasis on land and real estate are those for Peru,
Russia, Moldova, Mexico, Armenia, and Nicaragua. Land and real estate issues tend to
come up under broader sectoral themes such as private sector development, agricultural
and rural development, macroeconomic stability and structural reforms, and banking and
housing finance.  This broad, cross-cutting coverage is consistent with the important
linkages land and real estate have with these sectors. Notably missing from the sectoral
themes, however, are urban development strategies; i.e. land and real estate issues do not
tend to be conceived as part of an urban development strategy. Problem diagnosis of land
and real estate issues appears mainly in terms of missing or poorly functioning markets,
6 A Country Assistance Strategy, or CAS, is the main instrument for setting the Bank's operational policy framework
for a specific country.  It provides the Board of Directors with country background, diagnosis of structural and
sectoral problems, a rationale for prioritizing Bank involvement and associated risks, and proposed lending and non-
lending operations/instruments to be used by the Bank.
24title insecurity, and underdeveloped legal and administrative frameworks for secured
transactions and use of collateral. Finally, despite the attention given to poverty issues in
CASs, land and real estate aspects of poverty, or asset poverty in general, get little
attention. The Peru, El Salvador, and Brazil CASs are notable exceptions.  The Peru CAS
in particular makes rural and urban property central to its diagnosis of poverty problems.
See Box 1
The Peru Country Assistance Strategy (1997):
Development Objectives:
. Sugport  the  sustained  continuous  reduction  of  poverty  by  maintaining  economic  stability  and  improving  access
to  asic  services
*  Sustainable  growth  with  stability  and  structural  reform.
. Deepening of financial system
. Human development: Formalize property ownership and protect property rights
Diagnosis:
. Uncertain property rights in regards to land, water, and fisheries.
*  Limited financing, inefficient banking, no bank interest in rural and small enterprise credit.
. Majority of rural land holdings and more then one million urban properties lack adequate title and registration
reducing the value of assets and access
Government Strategy/Action:
*  Strengthen regulatory framework  to promote competition, assure autonomy of the regulatory institutions, and
enact new laws regulating water, land and fisheries.
*  Strengthening the legal and regulatory framework for banks, financial and capital markets.
. Formalize property ownership as a means of creating an asset base for the urban poor and promoting a
property market and financial intermediation; strengthening municipal tax base.
The most striking finding, however, was that the CAS review suggests a much
lower number of operations in land and real estate than is actually the case. In fact, out of
44 countries with active land and real estate lending operations since 1994, only 28 can
be traced back to CAS strategy/action plans. This can be explained in one of two ways:
either the current number of lending operations for land and real estate is too high
(relative to that envisioned in CASs) and should be revised downwards, or that CASs do
not always adequately project the need for land and real estate lending components and
should better detect such need in the future.  Which of the two explanations is true cannot
be conclusively addressed without further investigation into specific country portfolios.
25However, it is our impression that task leaders and country directors see the relevance of
land and real estate reforms to a range of sectors such that even in the absence of explicit
endorsement in the CAS, land and real estate issues are addressed as sub-components of
other projects, if not as stand-alone projects.  Why many CASs fail to anticipate the need
for this work has more to do with the cross-sectoral nature of land and real estate reforms:
strategies do not tend to be conceived across sectors but within them.  Just like issues of
decentralization and gender, land cuts across sectors and is not a sector itself. The risk,
of course, is a collective action dilemma where each sector would benefit from such
reforms but no sector can unilaterally undertake the effort. We propose that this is
happening with land and real estate not only in Bank CASs, but also in national strategy
designs where cross-sectoral issues get overlooked because they involve a large number
of stakeholders.
4.3 Evaluation against a yardstick
To assess the design of World Bank support to land and real estate reforms, we examined
the coverage of lending operations against the three critical areas for reform proposed in
Section 3: (1) Rights, Information, Contracting, and Enforcement (RICE); (2) Finance
and Risk Management; and (3) Market Regulations and Fiscal Policy.  We also examined
how these lending operations bundled the three areas of reform: how many operations
attempted all three, how many attempted two of the three, and how many focused on one
area of reform. We attached no a priori normative value to operations that are inclusive
of more reforms: first, not all countries need reforms in all three areas (different countries
are at different stages of development and different needs) and, second, even if all three
areas of reform need to be addressed in a particular country, they need not be addressed
simultaneously and under one project.  Indeed, evidence suggests that "Christmas tree"
projects with many components involving a number of counterparts can be more
problematic in implementation than narrowly-focused projects with a main counterpart.
Instead, we looked for evidence of project design containing references to all three areas
of reform: either by recognizing that they had already been carried out by the country, by
including them in project scope, or by flagging them as areas of reform for future projects
to tackle.
26Our analysis of 60 projects with primary focus on land and real estate reveals that
only a small proportion of projects (15 out of 60) address all three reform areas. Most
addressed one or two (see figure 7).  Notable is the limited overlap of projects which
combine finance and property rights issues. Furthermore, our review of the projects
which covered one or two of the reform areas indicates that the majority of these projects
(77 percent of the total in this category) make no mention of the reform area(s) left out
and provide no justification for leaving it out (i.e., they neither highlight these reforms as
already accomplished by the country, or as reforms to be addressed by the operation, or
to be left for future operations). In a few cases, such as the Poland Housing Project, the
project appraisal document devised its own framework within which project components
were situated.  This was the exception rather than the rule, however, and is hardly
surprising given the lack of an overall framework.  7
7  This of course still leaves the possibility that task managers and their project teams did
implicitly conceive of the project in terms of actions already taken and proper sequencing
of future actions.  However, we found no evidence of this in the Staff Appraisal Reports
or Project Appraisal Documents.
27Figure 7
Reform Components in Bank Supported Projects, 1988-1999
Market Regulation and  RICE
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4.4 Evaluation of Bank supported projects by OED
Evaluation of all Bank projects, including those dealing with land and real estate, is an
integral part of the World Bank's operational cycle. This evaluation is based on a well-
defined process and predetermined criteria. The process starts with the completion of
Implementation Completion Reports (ICR), which are prepared by staff and presented to
the Executive Board. This report evaluates the benefits of the project, the obstacles
encountered in implementation, and lessons learned. The next step is an independent
evaluation carried out by OED, which is intended to validate or adjust the evaluation
ratings. The ICRs and OED evaluations form the basis for the evaluation provided below.
28Box 2
OED Evaluation Criteria
The three criteria used in OED evaluations are: outcome, sustainability, and institutional
development.' Outcome is determined on the basis of whether the project achieved most of its
major goals efficiently and with few shortcomings. The rating takes into account: relevance
(were the operation's goals consistent with the country's overall development strategy and the
Bank's assistance strategy for that country?); efficacy (did the operation achieve its stated
physical, financial, institutional, or policy-related goals?); and efficiency (what inputs did it
take to produce those results?)
As for sustainability, it is defined as the likelihood that the project will maintain its
results in the future.  In essence, the evaluator determines whether, given the risks, future
benefits are likely to exceed future depreciation, operation, and maintenance costs. Several
factors are taken into account here, including country conditions (for example, the
government's commitment to the future of the project), govermnent policies, including policies
on cost recovery, availability of funds for operation and maintenance; the political situation,
sector conditions, and conditions specific to the project (particularly the quality of project
management and the capacity of project institutions).
Finally, the impact of the project on institutional development (ID) is defined broadly
as the extent to which a project has improved an agency's or a country's ability to make
effective use of its human and financial resources. To judge this impact, evaluators assess the
relevance of the project's ID objectives, the appropriateness of the adopted legal, regulatory, or
policy changes for meeting these objectives, their impact on behavior, the strength of the
agencies involved, and the improvement in the capacity of agencies to plan, conduct policy
analysis and deliver services on a sustainable basis.
On the basis of the OED criteria (see Box xx), we looked at projects with a
primary focus on land and real estate and have OED ratings over the period 1988-99.
Only 16 projects met these criteria. The rating of these projects is shown in Figure 8.
While the criteria themselves involve value judgment, the pattern of the results is
revealing. The majority of projects do reasonably well on outcome (74 percent) and
sustainability (62 percent). 8 In contrast, they do much less well on institutional
development (31 percent). To put such ratings in context, we compared them to OED
ratings of the overall Bank portfolio. This comparison shows that the sample's
These  results  are also  confirmed  by Quality  Assurance  Group  (QAG)  assessment  of project  risk  upon  entry.
29performance has been slightly better regarding the sustainability criterion, similar in
outcomes, but slightly worse with respect to the institutional development impact.
Figure 8
Performance of Land and Real Estate Projects
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The weak performance of projects with primary focus on land and real estate on
institutional development is surprising, given that land and real estate reforms are
institutional-intensive. Unlike ports and highways, land and real estate lending operations
are not intended to directly add to physical capital. Unlike health and education, they are
not intended to directly add to human capital. They ought to be mainly intended to
strengthen the institutions which define property rights, the ability to exercise  such
rights, and lower the cost of exercising such rights. While many land and real estate
operations are very effective in this regard and receive high ratings (the Third Thailand
Project received the World Bank Excellence Award), many are not.  A major factor in
explaining project success and failure has to do with the country context. 9 Even so, the
role of project design should not be underestimated. The OED evaluations suggest that
while projects are well designed in relation to their narrow objectives (thus the favorable
9 This is echoed in the conclusion reached in the 1998 Annual Review of Development Effectiveness with respect to
the high cost of weak institutions: the effects are more pronounced in low-income countries, projects yield lower
returns, and lower the country's  ability to adjust.  In 1998, only 40 % of Bank projects had substantial impact on
institutional development, whereas the percentage of Bank-supported projects with a satisfactory outcome increased
to 75% (1998, ARPP).
30ratings on outcomes and sustainability), they are not necessarily situated within a path or
program for institutional development and reform.
Although the OED evaluations do not define institutional reforms precisely as we
do in this paper, they nonetheless capture the general weakness of these operations to
contribute to "legal, regulatory, and policy changes... and the improvement in the
capacity of the agencies to plan, conduct policy analysis and deliver services on a
sustainable basis."
5. Concluding Remarks
Starting from the observation that land and real estate reforms have not been fully
effective in achieving their objectives, we argued in this paper that this outcome can be
traced at least in part to how these reforms were designed and implemented. In particular,
we argued that successful reforms need to be comprehensive in design, even if
implementation is phased out over time. We defined comprehensiveness as encompassing
three elements: (1) institutional reforms that better define property rights, reduce the
information asymmetry problem, and improve contract enforcement; (2) capital market
reforms that make the cost of and access to mortgagee finance feasible at reasonable
rates, especially to the poor; and (3) market reforms that reduce/eliminate the main
distortions in the prices of the goods and services produced by land and real estate assets.
Our review of land and real estate reforms supported by the World Bank lends
support to the above argument. In particular, we found that land and real estate reforms
tend to receive less attention at the conceptual stage than is justified by their impact on
poverty, growth, and stability. This conclusion is based on the limited coverage of land
and real estate issues in the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy, which is the main
vehicle for identifying priority areas for reform. We also found that actual Bank support,
as measured by the number of lending and non-lending operations, surpasses the number
of CASs that have references to land and real estate, suggesting that these issues are more
important in practice than believed up-front.
Another finding relates to the design of reform programs to better utilize land and
real estate. Namely, we found that most of the projects supported by the Bank do not
address all the three elements we consider critical for these reforms to be effective.
31Partial coverage would have been justified had it been part of an ongoing program of
reforms, with individual projects serving as building blocks. But that was not the case, as
the majority of projects did not provide a rationale for excluding missing ingredients, or a
justification for excluding. them, or a plan for a follow up in the future.
Finally, according to the World Bank's Operation and Evaluation Department,
Bank-supported projects in the area of land and real estate seem to perform
comparatively well relative to other Bank operations on outcomes and sustainability, but
much less on their contributions to institutional development. We find the latter to be a
source of concern, given that reforms of land and real estate are institutional in nature.
The implications of these findings are important for future work on land and real estate.
Provided there is an agreement that refonning land and real estate requires the
implementation of a framework of the type proposed here, both the Bank and
policymakers need to change course. They need to begin with a comprehensive
assessment of the status of real estate institutions and markets (see Appendix I). They
need to devise an implementation strategy that takes local conditions into account. And
they need to pull together the diverse actors working on land and real estate issues into
one team to deliver a difficult but most rewarding task.
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36Appendix I
Land and Real Estate Assessment
How can governments reform land and real estate markets and enable the full realization
of benefits from these assets to their population, especially the poor among them?  This
paper suggests that it cannot be done on an ad hoc basis. The analysis of World Bank
operations in this area supports the paper's argument: while individual projects do
deliver on promised outcomes (number of titles, number of mortgages, passing of laws
and regulations, etc.), they are less successful in effecting long-term reforms and
institutional development.  This is hardly surprising given the limited scope and time
span (2-4 years) of  individual projects.  For isolated projects/actions to make sustainable
contributions to reform and institutional development of land and real estate markets,
they have to be bundled and sequenced as part of a comprehensive reform agenda.
Today, no such agenda exists.
To move beyond the isolated projects/actions approach, we propose that more
diagnostic/analytical assessment of the functioning of land and real estate markets and the
impact on the poor be carried out up front.  Such assessment would not attempt to create
a blueprint of reforms for all countries at all times, but rather a "road map" for
considering the current state of development of land and real estate and prioritizing and
sequencing needed reforms and investments.  It would be done on a country basis,
highlight the linkages between various areas of reform, generate indicators which point
policymakers to gaps and bottlenecks in institutional development, and propose an action
plan for reforms and investments.  Using the framework developed in Section 3, the
paper identifies three main building blocks of such an assessment: i) Property Rights,
Information, Contracting and Enforcement (RICE); ii) Finance and Risk Management;
and iii) Market Regulation and Fiscal Policy.  Each of these building blocks would be
examined in terms of its growth, poverty alleviation, and stability implications.  Under
each of these three blocks a number of questions would be examined. The following list
represents some of the main questions to be considered in such an assessment.
Property Rights, Information, Contracting, and Enforcement (RICE):
37*  Are property rights well-defined and protected through formal, informal, or
traditional institutions?
*  Do existing institutions allow for the evolution and transformation of property rights
(e.g. from common or state to private)?
*  Can property rights be exercised? Do institutions exist to provide information, ensure
validity of transactions, enforce contracts, and resolve disputes?  What are the
transaction costs of exercising property rights?
*  How does the existing regime of property rights and contracting institutions affect the
poor's ability to access land and real estate and benefit from it?
Finance and Risk Management:
*  Is the macro environment conducive to the development of primary and secondary
mortgage markets?
3  Does the market structure allow for the development of a competitive private industry
in mortgage finance?
*  Are banking regulations (interest rates, reserve requirements, etc.) and supervision
adequate for the development of  mortgage finance?
*  Are capital markets developed?  Would institutional investors (pension funds,
insurance) generate demand for mortgage backed securities?  What impediments exist
to the development of secondary mortgage markets?
?  Are foreclosure and repossession laws and procedures well developed and reliable?
*  How do subsidy schemes operate in financial markets (interest rate, credit
enhancement, grants, buy-downs)?  How effective are such subsidies at reaching the
poor and what are their costs?
Market Regulation and Fiscal Policy
What are the effects of land use regulations in various markets (agriculture, housing,
commercial/industrial)? Are they flexible enough to allow for adjustment to market
forces? Are they focused enough to protect watershed and fragile areas and against
hazardous uses?
38*  What types of price controls exist in input and output markets which influence supply
and demand for land and real estate (rent control, agricultural price controls, etc.)?
*  What other regulatory or administrative controls affect the ability to invest and trade
in land and real estate?
*  What regulations govern the various land and real estate service industries (realtors,
valuation, insurance, surveyors, notaries. etc.)?  What is the impact of such
regulations (or lack thereof) on the development of competitive services?
*  What are the main tax and subsidy policies which affect incentives to invest or trade
in land and real estate?  What biases do such policies create among alternative
investments (stocks, bonds, etc.)? What biases do such policies create among various
classes of real estate (agriculture, housing, commercial/industrial, etc.)? What is the
effect of such policies on the poor's access, investment, and trade in land and real
estate?
The above questions are not exhaustive and would vary depending on the country
context. They are indicative of the types of issues addressed under the three building
blocks of an assessment.
The assessment we propose is not a silver bullet for land and real estate market
reform and development.  But we consider it a necessary element, along with political
will, capacity building, and attention to implementation in realizing the full benefits of
land and real estate assets. First, it would be an instrument to move from an ad hoc
approach to a systematic approach to reform. It would provide a forum for dialogue and
consensus building among the various stakeholders within a country.  Second, it would
allow policymakers to compare country performance to other countries.  Third, it would
allow international organizations such as the World Bank to better represent land and real
estate issues at the early stages of strategy formulation and ensure complementarity of
assistance by various donors. Finally, the assessment would be of use to local and
international private investors considering investments in real estate.
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